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Florida's Battle With the Federal
Government Over Immigration Policy
Holds Children Hostage: They Are
Not Our Children!
Angela M. Elsperger*
I. The Nature of the Problem
A. Jean and Carlos
Jean was born January 29, 1978, in Petit Goave, Haiti.1 In
September 1991, his father was killed after a military coup over-
threw the democratically elected President.2 Fearing their well-be-
ing, Jean's family hid from the military.3 Around October of 1992,
Jean's mother sent fourteen-year-old Jean unaccompanied to the
United States on a commercial fishing boat.4 Upon reaching the
United States, the child reached Miami, Florida, where he sought
the Haitian consulate.5 Jean was taken in by a woman whom he
met at the consulate and with whom he lived for approximately
eight months.6
In May 1993, Jean was abandoned at the Haitian Refugee
Center by the woman who had initially provided him with a home. 7
* B.A. 1992, University of North Dakota; Third-year law student at the Uni-
versity of North Dakota. I wish to thank Candace Zierdt, my Juvenile Law profes-
sor, for providing me with the paper topic for my Juvenile Law paper from which this
article originated. I also wish to thank Christina Zawisza and Alan Mishael for sup-
plying me with copies of the briefs and other material from the Florida litigation.
1. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law Opposing the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services' Motion to Dismiss Petition for Dependency at 3, In re R.R.,
(No. 94-15030D003) (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 2, 1994) (on file with the Law & Ineq. J.).
The child's name was deleted from the Memorandum by the child's attorney to pro-






6. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law Opposing the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services' Motion to Dismiss Petition for Dependency at 3, In re R.R.
(No. 94-15030D003) (Fla. Cir, Ct. filed Feb. 2, 1994).
7. Id.
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Wandering from shelter to shelter, homeless and penniless,8 Jean
sought assistance from Florida's Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services (HRS) hotline.9 HRS told the police to take the
child to Miami Bridge, a private shelter which provides temporary
housing for runaway children.1O Because of the temporary nature
of Miami Bridge, authorities from the facility soon notified Jean
that he would not be able to stay there any longer."
Like Jean, Carlos has had a troubling childhood.12 Carlos was
born on December 24, 1976, in Esquintla, Guatemala.13 Carlos'
mother was killed by guerrillas in Guatemala when Carlos was
seven years old, and he never knew his father. 14 Carlos was taken
in by the guerilla camp, but soon fled in order to return to the small
village of his birth.15 There, a neighbor cared for Carlos and two
other young boys who had also escaped from the guerilla camp.16
Finding Guatemala too dangerous, the neighbor abandoned the
boys and moved to El Salvador.17
When Carlos was ten years old, he left Guatemala for Mexico
and obtained work there at a grocery store. After two years,' 8 he
8. Id. at 3-4. The child was taken to Miami Bridge, a temporary shelter for
children, but the shelter later brought him to the Haitian American Community
Center which housed him at a motel for two nights. Id. Desperate, the child notified
the police, who refused to assist him. Id. at 3. Jean then sought refuge at a home-
less shelter where he was able to stay for a few days. Id. There, a church service
worker helped him, finding him a private home where he lived until November 1993.
Id. at 3-4. In November a different family of three shared their home, a one-room
apartment, with Jean. Id. at 4. In January 1994, severe poverty and cramped
quarters led Jean to the streets once again. Id.
9. Id. at 4. The HRS hotline refused at least two previous calls because the
child was an undocumented immigrant. Id. The third time that the hotline was
contacted, the concerned individual claimed that he had no knowledge of the child's
immigrant status, and only then did the HRS act. Id.
10. Id. HRS refused to investigate Jean's circumstances. Id.
11. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law Opposing the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services' Motion to Dismiss Petition for Dependency at 4, In re R.R.
(No. 94-15030D003) (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 2, 1994).
12. See Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and
in Support of Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem, In re Child, (No. 93-15754) (Fla.
Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 20, 1993) (on file with LAw & INEQ. J.). The child's name was
deleted on the Memorandum to protect confidentiality, but the child will be referred
to as "Carlos" for the purposes of this article.




17. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and in
Support of Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem at 2, In re Child, (No. 93-15754) (Fla.
Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 20, 1993).
18. Id. Petitioner's Memorandum indicates that it is unclear whether Carlos en-
tered the United States in 1988 or 1989. Id.
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entered the United States at the Texas border.19 In Texas, Carlos
remained homeless until he was taken in by a group of Mexican and
Honduran adults in Dallas. 20 Shortly thereafter, he left Dallas for
San Antonio, where he lived for two years.21 Carlos then moved to
Miami, Florida.22 Like Jean, Carlos sought shelter at Miami
Bridge, but Miami Bridge was unable to find assistance for Carlos
from any state agency because he did not have documentation. 2 3
Miami Bridge authorities encouraged Carlos to report himself to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),24 where he was
taken into custody. INS wished to transfer Carlos to an appropri-
ate placement, but HRS refused to take custody of the child.25
Attorneys for Jean and Carlos filed dependency petitions in
Florida's Circuit Court Juvenile Division so that Jean and Carlos
could be found dependent and, thus qualify for the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services' programs, such as foster care
placement and special immigrant J-visa status.26 Prior to the de-
pendency hearings, however, HRS fied motions for dismissal, as-
serting that the Florida courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the
dependency actions because the children were illegal aliens. 2 7 The
Florida Circuit Court granted the department's motions for dismis-
sal for lack of jurisdiction and, as a result, denied Jean and Carlos
foster care and other social services.28
B. Florida's Struggle With the Budget
Until recently, Florida's Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services took state custody of immigrant children without in-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. During that time, Carlos lived with members of a Refugee Aid Project for
a month in 1993. Id. The Project raised a collection to get Carlos bus fare to Miami,
Florida, so he could meet up with a friend who never arrived. Id. at 2-3.
22. Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and in
support of Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem at 3, In re Child, (No. 93-15754) (Fla.
Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 20, 1993).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. INS facilities are inappropriate facilities for children because INS cannot
substitute as parents, nor can INS facilities substitute as homes for children. Peti-
tioner's Memorandum at 14, In re R.R., (No. 94-15030D003).
26. Telephone Interview with Christina Zawisza, Attorney, Legal Services of
Greater Miami (Mar. 14, 1994) [hereinafter Zawisza].
27. Petitioner's Memorandum at 2, In re R.R. (No. 94-15030D003); Petitioner's
Memorandum at 4, In re Child, No. (93-15754).
28. Zawisza, supra note 26. The Petitioners are appealing the decisions. See
R.G. v. Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, (No. 94-00779) (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. filed June 8, 1994). Following Jean's and Carlos' action against HRS,




cident and without reference to their undocumented status. 29
Florida's policy of not making distinctions between children based
on their alienage reflected the state's overriding social and humani-
tarian interest in the welfare of all children, regardless of their
citizenship.30
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has ap-
parently reconsidered its interest in the welfare of all children by
requiring children to show documentation before qualifying for
child welfare services. 31 Although Florida does not require citizen-
ship or legal resident status in its dependency statutes32 or admin-
istrative policies,33 the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services is requiring such documentation in its practice.34 The
State of Florida's limited resources and the Federal government's
"unrealistic immigration policies"35 were considerations which led
to this seemingly uncharitable decision; but Florida officials plead
that they were without alternative.36
C. Florida's Governor's Plea for Payment
The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform has been hold-
ing public hearings to review and evaluate the impact of current
immigration policy in the United States and to report its findings to
Congress.37 The Commission was formed to recommend immigra-
tion policy changes which would be consistent with domestic and
international realities, national interests, and humanitarian per-
29. Florida Governor Tells of Alien Woes; Chiles Says Illegal Immigrants Costing
State $1 Billion Yearly, DALLAs MORNING NEws, Feb. 12, 1994, at 4A [hereinafter
Alien Woes].
30. Judge J. Daniel Dowell et al., Protection and Custody of Children in the
United States Immigration Court Proceedings, 16 NovA L. REv. 1285 (1992) (advo-
cating that Congress vest immigration judges with the ability to appoint guardians
ad litem so that children's rights and personal well-being are fully protected).
31. Alien Woes, supra note 29, at 4A.
32. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.01, 39.40-.404 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (statute does
not explicitly require citizenship or legal resident status for dependency
determination).
33. FIA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 10M-6.141 (1992) (stating that unaccompanied mi-
nors who are refugees or entrant minors are provided child welfare services).
34. See supra notes 9 and 24 and accompanying text (stating that HRS refused
to provide services to undocumented children).
35. Alien Woes, supra note 29, at 4A (quoting Governor Chiles).
36. Choosing What Child Suffers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1994, at 4B.
37. See, e.g., Meeting Notice, 59 Fed. Reg. 3331 (1994) (announcing Hearing of
Commission with government officials and others in Miami, Florida, on February 11,
1994); Meeting Notice, 59 Fed. Reg. 9965 (1994) (announcing Hearing of Commission




spectives.3 8 The Commission's first report, which includes recom-
mendations to Congress, was made available September 30, 1994.39
Due to outcries by public officials and media coverage, the public
has become increasingly aware of the growing population of un-
documented aliens in the United States and the domestic problems
that such growth exacerbates. 40
The growing immigration population has prompted the crea-
tion of social programs which require intergovernmental coopera-
tion between Federal, State, and local governments. 41 The fiscal
responsibilities in administering the programs are creating
problems for state and local governments in particular.42 States
such as Florida feel overly burdened by Federal immigration poli-
cies mandated without accompanying federal support.43
38. U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING
CREDIEILrrY - A REPORT TO CONGRESS at 24-25.
39. 59 Fed. Reg. 3331 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 9965 (1994). The Commission ac-
knowledged the fiscal impact that the ineffective enforcement of Federal immigra-
tion law has had on States and localities. U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM,
U.S. IMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING CREDmIrY - A REPORT TO CONGRESS 25
(1994) (stating that "the federal government clearly bears a responsibility for allevi-
ating the impacts of unlawful immigration," the Commission supported authoriza-
tion of impact aid to offset the fiscal burden during the short-term while immigration
enforcement is improved). Id. at 24-25.
40. ELIzABETH HULL, WrrHouT JUSTICE FOR ALL: Tm CONSTrUTIONAL RIGHTs
OF ALMNS 79-80 (1985). See also, Larry Rohter, Florida Opens New Front in Fight
on Immigrant Policy, N.Y. TInEs, Feb. 11, 1994, at A14 (addressing Florida's influx
of illegal immigrants and inability to provide state support for both aliens and citi-
zens) [hereinafter New Front in Fight]. Immigration policy is complex and emotion-
ally divisive, particularly because of the "nation of immigrant" status of the United
States. Susan Forbes Martin, U.S. Immigration Policy: Challenges for the 1990s, 4
NATL STRATEGY REP. 1, 1 (1993). Although the United States continues to value its
diversity and immigrant tradition, government officials and individual states have
become increasingly concerned about the ability of the United States to absorb the
immigrant population. Id. at 5.
Even when this paper was in its final stages, immigration was frequently at the
forefront of national concern. On September 9, 1994, the United States and Cuba
reached a U.S.-Cuban Immigration Agreement. The Agreement was made in re-
sponse to an emergency influx of Cuban immigration to the United States. U.S. An-
nounces Rules to Ease Cuban Immigration, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1994, at A26.
The Agreement includes a pledge to bring 20,000 Cuban immigrants to the United
States annually by using a more efficient process for granting visas. Id. In ex-
change, Cuba pledged to stop the Cuban exodus to the United States in unsafe struc-
tures. U.S. and Cuba to Meet on Immigration Issues, N.Y. TImxs, Oct. 19, 1994, at
A14. The means by which the Agreement will be implemented are still being negoti-
ated. Id. Although the impact that the Agreement will have on Florida's foster care
situation is uncertain, the recent exodus to the United States makes all the more
urgent the need for the federal government and Florida to resolve the issue of who is
responsible for the care of immigrant children.
41. Martin, supra note 40, at 5.
42. Id.
43. Id. Florida, California, New York, Hawaii, and New Jersey, are "home" to
78% of the foreign born in the United States. Id.
1994]
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During the Commission's fact-finding visit to South Florida,
Floridian officials and citizens informed the Commission about
Florida's struggle with United States's immigration policy.44 Gov-
ernor Lawton Chiles claimed that Florida had done its part to help
immigrants, but that the federal government needed to do more to
assist the States.45 Telling the Commission that the Federal Gov-
ernment must "open its eyes to unrealistic immigration policy,"46
Governor Chiles asserted that the Federal Government has inade-
quately funded programs which were supposed to reimburse the
States for providing services to immigrants.47 Governor Chiles es-
timated that the illegal alien population alone costs Florida over
one billion dollars a year. 48
44. Impacts of Immigration on South Florida, 1994: Hearings on Immigration
Reform Before the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (Feb. 11, 1994) (unpub-
lished Commission Summary, on file with the author) [hereinafter Impacts on South
Florida]. The Commission has engaged a two-track approach to research the United
States' immigration policies, the first track addressing short-term issues, and the
second track addressing long-term impacts of immigration legislation. Susan Forbes
Martin, The Commission on Immigration Reform, 21 MIGRATION WORLD 43, 43
(1993). The discussions in Florida between the Commission and Florida officials
were part of the fact-finding process intended to investigate the impacts of immigra-
tion on the United States and to collect data from state and local agencies. Id.
45. Impacts on South Florida, supra note 44, at 5.
46. Alien Woes, supra note 29, at 4A. Governor Chiles stated that the federal
government is not enforcing its immigration laws, enabling undocumented aliens to
come to the United States without being deported, either because they are not
caught by the INS or because the INS has chosen not to deport them. Impacts on
South Florida, supra note 44, at 7. He argued that the federal government must
enforce its immigration laws better and take responsibility for the costs which result
from its immigration policy. Id. An example of the impact of the Federal govern-
ment's failure to enforce the immigration laws or to provide payment includes a 1993
Miami hospital report that visits by undocumented aliens accounted for 16% of its
total visits, amounting to a total cost of $312 million, of which $240 million went
unpaid. Id.
When an Immigration Reform Commissioner asked Governor Chiles whether
certain federal immigration laws were especially "unrealistic," the Governor replied
that after liberal amnesty was granted by the federal government in the 1980s, the
government claimed that it would strictly enforce the immigration laws, but then did
not. Id. Governor Chiles failed to provide the Commission with a recommendation
that included specific programs or statutes, but he stated that in balancing Florida's
annual budget, he had to make "hard choices." Id. He felt that the federal govern-
ment should also be required to balance its books. Id.
47. Impacts on South Florida, supra note 44, at 7. Immigration was at the fore-
front of Governor Chiles election campaign. See Bush, Chiles Still Split on Immigra-
tion, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 26, 1994, at IA. Florida voters considered
immigration to be second in their list of concerns only to crime, which was their
primary concern. Id.
48. Bush, Chiles Still Split on Immigration, supra note 47, at 1A (the actual
figure cited by Governor Chiles was $1.5 billion). Members of the Governor's cabinet
illustrated for the Commission the extent of the expenses for services which Florida
provided to aliens. The Education Commissioner, Doug Jamerson, stated that the
cost of federally mandated education of foreign-born students, including illegal and
legal aliens and refugees, was $45 million dollars in Dade County alone, which spent
[Vol. 13:141
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An ongoing battle has developed between the States and the
Federal government regarding reimbursement for programs and
demands that the Federal government has placed on the States.
Immigration experts contend Florida's recent move to deny foster
care to undocumented immigrant children displays a new aggres-
siveness on the part of state officials.49 Florida's hardline decision
involving undocumented immigrant children is a response to the
lack of federal support, both in enforcing immigration laws and re-
imbursement for program costs.
The Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, Jim Towey, informed the Commission that Florida ad-
ministers foster care to 9,000 children.5O Towey claimed that, due
to costs and the lack of resources, Florida can barely provide for
children who are citizens, let alone undocumented children.51 How-
ever, only 113 of the children receiving foster care in Florida are
undocumented immigrants. 52
Florida's denial of foster care has been criticized by children's
interests groups such as the National Association of Social Workers
$581 for every new foreign-born student. Impacts on South Florida, supra note 44,
at 6. Harry Singletary, the Secretary of Corrections, stated that Florida spent $133
million dollars to incarcerate illegal aliens from 1988 to 1993, none of which was
reimbursed by the federal government. Id.
Governor Chiles pleaded that the "[flederal bills are being charged to Florida's
account, and [Florida has] had enough. We are depriving our citizens... because we
are having to take care of illegal immigrants." Alien Woes, supra note 29, at 4A.
49. New Front in Fight, supra note 40 at A14. While Florida was filing suit
against the federal government for reimbursement, California displayed its own ag-
gressiveness by approving the Proposition 187 initiative on November 8, 1994, which
purports to bar "illegal aliens" from receiving many public benefits, including educa-
tion. Jerry Seper, Reno Has Proposition 187 Situation on Watch; No Signal If, How
Justice Will Step In, WASH. Ttais, Nov. 11, 1994, at A15. Temporary restraining
orders have halted enforcement of the law. Id. The decisions rely on the Supreme
Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Id. Proposition 187 has impli-
cations beyond the scope of this article, but the article reflects the federalism con-
cerns and raises the same constitutional questions. See infra notes 112-87 and
accompanying text (applying Plyler v. Doe analysis to Florida's situation).
50. New Front in Fight, supra note 40, at A14.
51. Id.
52. Telephone Interview with John Perry, Florida's Chief of Child Protection
Services (Apr. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Perry]. Previously, the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services did not collect data regarding the immigrant status of
children seeking care. Telephone Interview with Jack Ahearn, Florida's Chief of
Permanency Planning (Apr. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Ahearn]. After the Commission
questioned Florida officials on the number of undocumented immigrant children in
their care, Florida began collecting the data. Perry, supra. See Plaintiffs' Mem.
Supp. Summ. J. at 19-20, Doe v. Towey, (No. 94-1696) (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 17,
1994) (citing Elsperger, Florida's Battle with the Federal Government Over Immigra-
tion Policy Holds Children Hostage: "They Are Not Our Children!" (unpublished
manuscript)).
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and the Child Welfare League,53 but Secretary Towey claims that
the denial is for humane, as well as economic reasons.54 He
claimed that the tough approach was to avoid the "magnetic effect"
that providing foster care to illegal immigrant children would have
on Florida.55 In addition, Towey claimed that if foster care were
provided to undocumented children, a signal would be sent to par-
ents in countries such as Cuba, Haiti, and Guatemala that a right
to foster care exists in the United States and, thus, a better life for
their children.56 This perception, according to the Secretary, would
risk children's lives at sea.5 7
Aside from defending in court its policy which denies foster
care to children based upon their immigrant status,55 Florida has
filed a lawsuit against the Federal government seeking reimburse-
ment for services that Florida has already provided to immi-
grants.59 Although the Florida policy has assisted state officials in
53. New Front in Fight, supra note 40, at A14 (quoting Luisa Lopez of the Na-
tional Association of Social Workers as stating that the policy was a disservice to the
children and the greater community). Ira Kurzban, an attorney specializing in im-
migration law, stated that Florida's approach creates an "underclass in society"
which is helpless in that it does not have a source to obtain support. Alien Woes,
supra note 29, at 4A. Without support, the children turn to criminal activity. Id.
Jim Towey, Florida's Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, confirmed Kurzban's observation to the Commission when he stated that
many of the children turn to prostitution and crime because they cannot find assist-
ance. Impact on South Florida, supra note 44, at 6.
54. New Front in Fight, supra note 40, at A14.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The Secretary's concern is based on the thousands of Cubans and Hai-
tians who have arrived in the United States since the 1980s after journeys at sea,
many immigrants having endured the voyage on makeshift rafts and wooden boats.
Id.
58. When questioned, Jack Ahearn stated that there was not a policy in place
which denied services to undocumented children. Instead, he stated that the policy
was exactly the opposite and that HRS did not ask children their immigration sta-
tus. Ahearn, supra note 52. When asked if that was Florida's policy, then why two
children were denied services, he stated that he was aware of the situation but that
no official policy had been drafted. Id. On April 14, 1994, an HRS agency provided a
"directive" entitled "IRS Handling of Cases in Conjunction With INS." Plaintiffs'
Mem. of Law in Supp. of S.J. at 1, Doe v. Towey, No. (94-1696) (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Oct.
25, 1994). The "directive's" validity, authority, and applicability to Florida law is
being challenged. Id. at 5. The "directive" considers immigration status when deter-
mining whether a child should be provided HRS services. Plaintiffs' Complaint for
Injunctive Relief, Doe v. Towey, (No. 94-1696) (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 17, 1994).
59. Impacts on South Florida, supra note 44, at 7. Florida's lawsuit against the
Federal Government has been coined a "rebellion" by states which cannot afford the
costs of illegal immigrants any longer. Florida Governor Tells U.S.: Pay for Aliens,
ST. Louis Posr, Feb. 12, 1994, at B13.
Governor Chiles filed suit on behalf of the State of Florida, Dade County Public
Health Trust, and the Dade County School Board against the United States on April
11, 1994. Reena Shah Stamets, Chiles Sues Government Over Illegal Immigrants,
TAMPA TODAY, Apr. 12, 1994, at 1B [hereinafter Chiles Sues Government]. Also
[Vol. 13:141
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gaining the nation's attention,60 denial of foster care is not consis-
tent with the requirements of Florida law,61 Federal statute,6 2 nor
the U.S. Constitution.63
11. The Foster Care System: A Need for
Intergovernmental Cooperation
Florida Statutes section 39.40(2) provides that the circuit
court shall have "exclusive original jurisdiction" in a dependency
proceeding. 64 Florida Statutes' definition of a "child" is not limited
to citizens or legal residents.65 The Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services regulation, promulgated pursuant to Chapter
named as defendants in the suit were Immigration Commissioner Doris Meissner;
Miami INS District Director, Walter Cadman; Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices, Donna Shalala; and Attorney General, Janet Reno, who was the former Dade
County State Attorney prior to her cabinet position. Id.
The suit alleges that Florida spent nearly $1 billion a year on services to illegal
aliens, such as education, medical services, and welfare without reimbursement
from the Federal government. Reuters, U.S. Is Sued Over Aliens, N.Y. TndEss, Apr.
11, 1994, at A13. The suit has been coined a "political attention grabber" or "political
rally" rather than a lawsuit with significant merit. Stamets, Chiles Sues Govern-
ment, at lB. The suit will likely pay off more with political leverage in Washington
than reimbursement of costs by a court judgment. William E. Gibson, Chiles Sues to
Recoup $1.5 Billion Spent on Illegal Immigrants, ORLANDo SENT., Apr. 12, 1994, at
C1. Perhaps that was Florida's intent. Prior to filing the suit, Governor Chiles
stated "[wihat do we have to do to get [the federal government's] attention. We have
pleaded and begged, so it's kind of like, We'll see you in court.'" Diane Rado, Study:
State Pays $884 Million for Illegal Aliens, TAMPA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1994, at 4B.
As this article was in its final stages, Mr. George High, the executive director of
the Center for Immigration Studies in Washington, stated that because immigration
is largely under the control of the Federal government, governors cannot affect im-
migration policy "'unless they really start shouting, screaming and bringing the
house down.'" Impacts on South Florida, supra note 44, at 7. Perhaps Chiles'
"bringing the house down" and Florida's filing a complaint against the Federal gov-
ernment contributed to the allocation of more than six million dollars for refugee
assistance. Id.
60. See Impacts on South Florida, supra note 44, at 7; Florida Seeks Federal Aid
in Support of Immigrants (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 11, 1994) (reporting that
Florida filed suit against the United States); Paul Leavitt, Immigration Costs, USA
TODAY, Jan. 18, 1994, at 8A (announcing the petition which Legal Services of
Greater Miami filed against the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
due to the Department's refusal to take two minor illegal immigrants as wards).
61. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 67-106 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 109-194 and accompanying text.
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.40(2) (West 1988). See Padgett v. Pettis, 445 So.2d 633,
635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that a circuit court has inherent and continu-
ing jurisdiction to enter orders pertaining to a child's welfare).
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(7) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). Section 39.01(7Xa)
provides that a child is any unmarried person under eighteen who is "alleged to be
dependent, in need of services, or from a family in need of services, or any married or
unmarried person who is charged with a violation of law occurring prior to the age of
eighteen." Id. (emphasis added).
19941
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39 of the Florida Statutes, expressly recognizes that undocumented
children are to be provided with child welfare services and bene-
fits.66 Although HRS policy has not been modified by either legisla-
tive enactments or policy changes, Jean and Carlos have been
denied care with Florida's knowledge and apparent approval. 67
A Florida court is competent to decide child custody matters
when the child is physically present in Florida and the child has
been abandoned or neglected;68 or the best interests of the child
require the court to assume jurisdiction;69 or it appears that no
other state would have jurisdiction. 70 Jean and Carlos are children
within Florida's definition because they are under eighteen and
have filed a dependency petition with the court. Because the circuit
court has sole jurisdiction over dependency matters, it must hear
Jean's and Carlos' petitions because the children are in the United
States without any parent or guardian, they have no means of ob-
taining assistance, and they cannot return to their countries of ori-
gin because of political unrest. Although the court does not have to
grant either petition, Jean's and Carlos' best interests require that
their dependency petitions be heard by the court pursuant to Flor-
ida statute and policy.
Dismissing Jean and Carlos' petitions for lack of jurisdiction
also contravenes Federal law which depends upon the States to de-
66. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1OM-6.141 (1992). Florida recognizes that refu-
gees or entrant children are to receive care from the state, but that the care costs are
reimbursed by the Federal government. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying
text (discussing the Refugee Act of 1980).
67. Florida's policy is unclear and a discrepancy exists as to the policy's author-
ity. See supra note 58 (discussing HRS policy). No Florida legislation has been pro-
posed or adopted which would modify the dependency statutes or jurisdiction of the
courts. Florida has addressed the immigration situation in its last legislative ses-
sion, however. A Florida Commission on Newcomer Issues was formed to serve as a
state liaison to federal agencies and state congressional delegations. H.B. 1117, S.
2426, 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1. Among its duties, the Commission on Newcomer
Issues is to identify population figures, develop and maintain an inventory of federal
grant programs, and keep inventory of state and local matching fund requirements.
Id.
The Florida Legislature also offered a Memorial to Congress in which the Legis-
lature urged Congress to take action with respect to aliens and financial assistance
to states for their provision of services to aliens. H.B. 1219, 1994 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 1. Because the Federal government is responsible for immigration policy and
state and local governments have the responsibility to provide services, Florida re-
quested that the states be provided with funding. Id. The Memorial also urged co-
operation between Florida and federal agencies, particularly the INS. Id. No
specific legislation was introduced pertaining to foster care. See id.
68. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 6 1.1308(cXl-2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
69. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.1308(dX2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
70. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.1308(d)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
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termine the best interests of immigrant children.71 Furthermore,
both Federal and State statutory schemes require cooperation be-
tween Federal and State governments. The States receive pay-
ments from the Federal government for providing federally
approved foster care to qualified children.72 To receive the federal
payments, a state must have its plan for foster care approved by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.73 Before approval, all
plans must conform to the federal statutory requirements which
provide for foster care maintenance payment programs. 74
The state must make payments to qualified children, as de-
fined under the Federal statute.7 5 If the child has received or could
receive aid under the federally approved state plan for aid to fami-
lies with children,76 the child is eligible for foster care payments.77
Because neither Jean nor Carlos is a citizen or permanent resident-
alien of the United States, each must reside within the United
States "under color of law" to receive aid under the foster care stat-
utory framework. 78
The statutory language "[plermanently residing under color of
law" has received much attention by courts and commentators be-
cause it is subject to various interpretations. 79 A better-reasoned
interpretation of the statutory language would recognize eligibility
71. See infra note 97 (discussing Federal law's dependence on State court
determinations).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1994) (providing federal payments for
foster care and adoption assistance).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
74. Id. (stating that the plan must provide for foster care maintenance payments
in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 672 (1991 & Supp. 1994)).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1991 & Supp. 1994) (providing federal aid for approved state
plans for aid and services to needy families with children). Section 602(aX33) (Supp.
1994) provides that in order for any child to be considered dependent and thus eligi-
ble for AFDC, the child must be either "(A) a citizen, or (B) an alien lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in the United States
under color of law," or as a result of an application for asylum.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 672(aX4) (1991 & Supp. 1994). Section 672(aX4) provides an ex-
ception for children who are excluded from federal benefits under Title 8. As long as
the child would otherwise qualify for benefits under § 602, the child is eligible for
foster care maintenance payments. § 672(a)(4). Section 672 requires that other pro-
visions be met before a child has been considered "qualified" under the provision, but
qualification under section 602 is the primary criterion. See § 672(a)-(b).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1991 & Supp. 1994) (describing requirements for chil-
dren to qualify for aid under § 602).
79. Robert Rubin, Walking a Gray Line: The 'Color of Law" Test Governing
Noncitizen Eligibility for Public Benefits, 24 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 411 (1987). Propo-
nents exist for both narrowly and expansively construing the statutory language.
Id. at 411-12. Those who urge a narrow construction claim that making benefits
widely available to undocumented immigrants lures aliens to this country. Id. at
411. Those who urge a more liberal interpretation do so to protect persons who are
permitted to remain in the United States. Id. at 412.
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for assistance to aliens that the INS has permitted to reside in the
United States "under federal immigration policy and practice."80
Under this interpretation, as long as the undocumented immigrant
resides in the United States with INS knowledge and permission,
including inchoate permission, the individual satisfies the statutory
requirement.8 '
In Holley v. Lavine, an undocumented alien mother sought
federal assistance.8 2 The INS indicated that it knew of the wo-
man's presence in this country but would not exercise its ability to
deport her "at [that] time."83 Recognizing that an executive official
has discretionary power to enforce deportation, the Second Circuit
found that because of INS knowledge and refusal to exercise its
power to deport her, the woman was residing in the United States
"under color of law."8 4
The Holley court also liberally interpreted "permanently resid-
ing" in the United States. Deriving the definition of "permanently"
from the immigration statute's definition of "permanent," the court
found that the mother needed to have a relationship of a continuous
nature with the United States, even though the relationship may
have been terminated by either the United States or the individual
at any time.8 5 Thus, the woman satisfied the statutory require-
ment of "permanently residing in the United States under color of
law" and was eligible for assistance.8 6
Jean and Carlos have been residing in Florida with the knowl-
edge of INS officials. 8 7 The INS has indicated that it does not wish
to take custody of Jean nor initiate deportation proceedings.88 Sim-
ilarly, the INS has stated that although it has Carlos in custody, it
wishes to place him in foster care, and has stayed deportation pro-
80. Janet M. Calvo, Alien Status Restrictions on Eligibility for Federally Funded
Assistance Programs, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 395,431 (1987-88). A broad
interpretation of the language is more just and humane because restrictions in its
application adversely affect the most vulnerable in society, in this instance children.
Id.(stating that vulnerable groups include children, the elderly, and the
handicapped).
81. Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 850 (2d Cir. 1977).
82. Id. at 847-48.
83. Id. at 850.
84. Id. See also Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1985) (per-
mitting alien's inchoate presence in the United States to satisfy the "under color of
law' statutory requirement).
85. Holley, 553 F.2d at 850 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33), which defines
"permanent").
86. Id.
87. Petitioner's Memorandum at 5, In re R.R. (No. 94-15030D003); Petitioner's
Memorandum at 3, In re Child (No. 93-15754).
88. Petitioner's Memorandum at 5, In re R.R. (No. 94-15030D003).
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ceedings pending the outcome of his dependency petition.89 Jean's
and Carlos' presence is also "permanent" within Holley's statutory
interpretation since the INS has failed to deport them, even though
it has such ability.90 Like the woman in Holley, Jean and Carlos
are eligible for aid because they are permanently residing in the
United States under color of law.91
Even if Jean and Carlos are not permanently residing in the
United States under color of law, they are "refugees."92 Refugees
were given special protections and benefits by Congress under the
Refugee Act of 1980.93 Under the Act, unaccompanied refugee chil-
dren may receive child welfare services, including foster care main-
tenance payments and services, until the child reaches one month
past the age of eighteen.94 The Federal government may reimburse
the States for one hundred percent of these costs.9 5
Although the Federal government enjoys almost full reign in
defining immigration status, 96 the Federal statutes rely on the
States' abilities to determine the best interests of the children and
89. Petitioner's Memorandum at 3, In re Child (No. 93-15754).
90. See Holley, 553 F.2d at 850 (discussing Holley's interpretation of "perma-
nently" as consistent with 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(33)'s definition of "permanent"). See
also Brief for Appellant at 24, R.G. v. Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, (No. 94-0079) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. filed June 8, 1994) (citing Elsperger, Flor-
ida's Battle with the Federal Government Over Immigration Policy Holds Children
Hostage: "They Are Not Our Children!" (unpublished manuscript, 1994) for the chil-
dren's inchoate justification to reside in the United States).
91. See Calvo, supra note 80, at 413 (stating that post-Holley cases have failed to
reach a consensus on the appropriate application of the standard, but that most have
looked to the reality of immigration law, policy, or practice and have found the stan-
dard satisfied if the alien resides in the United States with the knowledge of the INS,
and the aliens continued presence has been condoned by INS failure to deport).
92. A "refugee" is any person who is unwilling or unable to return to his or her
country of nationality because of persecution or fear of persecution "on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opin-
ion," or as granted by the President of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(aX42)
(Supp. 1994). Jean and Carlos are unwilling to return to their countries because of
fear of persecution. See supra notes 3, 14-17 and accompanying text (stating that
Jean was hiding from a military coup and Carlos was seeking refuge from a guerillan
camp).
93. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The purpose of the Act was to provide humanitarian
assistance to refugees. Id.
94. Refugee Act of 1980, § 412, 8 U.S.C. § 1522 (dX2XB) (1988). Section 1522(d),
which specifically provides assistance for refugee children, refers to the application
of foster care maintenance payments. The section also permits the federally ap-
proved State plan to extend the age requirement past eighteen, as long as the refu-
gee is prescribed the same availability to the program as other children of the state.
Id.
95. Id.
96. See infra notes 110-119 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of the
federal government to define immigration status in the United States).
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to provide care in exchange for funding.97 Florida claims that the
INS has sole jurisdiction over the undocumented juveniles, yet the
Federal statutory scheme requires a cooperative federalism in
which the immigration statutes under Title 8 have relied upon the
child welfare programs under Title 42.98 By accepting federal fund-
ing, Florida must comply with the federal conditions.
Federal law allows an undocumented child to obtain "special
immigrant status" if a juvenile court finds the child dependent, eli-
gible for long-term foster care, and that it is in his or her best inter-
ests to stay in the United States.99 Federal regulation defines a
juvenile court as a United States court having jurisdiction "under
State law to make judicial determinations about the custody and
care of juveniles."lOO A child's eligibility for long-term foster care
requires a juvenile court's determination that family reunification
is not feasible. 101 In Florida, the circuit court is the only court with
jurisdiction to make dependency determinations. 10 2 Thus, by deny-
ing undocumented children the jurisdiction of juvenile court for de-
pendency proceedings, Florida has denied Jean and Carlos access to
"special immigrant status" which would permit them to apply for
lawful, permanent residence in the United States.10 3
A state's participation in the federally assisted welfare pro-
gram is voluntary, but election to participate obligates a state to
comply with the Federal statutes and regulations which govern the
program.104 The foster care assistance provision under Part E of
Title 42 is a component of a "scheme of cooperative federalism" be-
tween the Federal government and the states.'05 Under coopera-
97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(aX27)(J) (relying on state juvenile courts to determine
the dependency of an undocumented child); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(4) (permitting alien
children to qualify for foster care maintenance payments considering the best inter-
est of the child pursuant to § 671(e)); 58 Fed. Reg. 42,850 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.11) (proposed Aug. 12, 1993) (providing that the juvenile court must determine
dependency and eligibility for foster care pursuant to the state's program).
98. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between the Federal government and the state).
99. 8 U.S.C. § 11o1(a)(27)J)(1988).
100. Immigrant Petitions, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,850 (1993) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.11) (proposed Aug. 12, 1993).
101. Id.
102. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.40(2) (West 1988).
103. See 8 U.S.C. § 1204 (1970 & Supp. 1994). An immigrant visa may be issued
to a special immigrant who has shown that he or she is of "special immigrant sta-
tus." Id.
104. Pratt v. Wilson, 770 F. Supp. 539, 541 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (citing Philbrook v.
Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975)).
105. In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1967), the Court referred to the AFDC
program, of which the foster care assistance is a subpart, as a scheme of cooperative
federalism because both the Federal and State governments were involved: the pro-
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tive federalism, Congress explicitly and implicitly defines the
boundaries of state prerogatives.106
Because Florida is provided funding for foster care assistance
by the Federal government, Congress is able to explicitly and im-
plicitly affect Florida's foster care program, which Congress has
done to further immigration policy. Because Congress requires de-
pendency determinations and foster care assistance for undocu-
mented immigrant children, Florida must comply, unless Florida
wishes to jeopardize its federally assisted welfare programs for its
citizens. 10 7 But even if Florida is willing to risk its federal funding,
the Florida policy is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment' 0 8 and the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. 109
I. Equal Protection of the Law
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."110 By finding that the illegal alien
children are not within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, Flor-
ida denied the children equal protection of Florida state law."'
However, not all distinctions between groups of immigrants are
unconstitutional.
gram is financed largely by the federal government on a matching fund basis while
the program is administered by the States.
106. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 615-16 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 432
U.S. 439 (1977).
107. Considering the small number of undocumented children in Florida's foster
care system, it would be economically efficient for Florida to comply with the immi-
gration statutes. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (stating that only 113 of
the 9,000 children in foster care are undocumented children).
108. See infra notes 108-186 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
110. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. The Petitioners did not challenge the motion to dismiss on equal protection
grounds pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Zawisza, supra note 26. How-
ever, an equal protection challenge was deemed "very plausible." Id. Consistent
with constitutional doctrine, the Petitioners avoided the constitutional challenge.
Id. See, e.g., Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (stating that
it is prudent for a court to avoid decision on a constitutional question when alterna-
tive grounds exist for resolution). Rather, the Petitioners challenged the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services' Motion for Dismissal based upon the
Florida State Constitution and Florida statutes. Zawisza, supra note 26. The Flor-
ida policy has been challenged as violative of equal protection. Plaintiffs' Complaint
for Injunctive Relief, Doe v. Towey, (No. 94-1696) (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 17, 1994).
1994]
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A. Unequal Powers Under the Constitution
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to "establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization." 112 Based upon this power,
Congress has developed a complex immigration scheme governing
legal admission to the United States 1ia that reflects foreign and do-
mestic policy decisions.114 The States, however, are not granted
constitutional power to classify aliens and, therefore, are more lim-
ited in their ability to draw distinctions based on alienage.115
Courts scrutinize alienage classifications pursuant to constitutional
requirements, regardless of which governmental body draws the
distinction.116
Who draws the distinction or classification affects the level of
judicial scrutiny that a court will use. Classifications drawn by
states which treat aliens differently on the basis of status are re-
viewed pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, while classifications drawn by federal acts are re-
viewed pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 117 State laws which distribute benefits or limit opportunities
on the basis of alienage are subject to strict scrutiny, which re-
quires the state to show a compelling state interest for the classifi-
cation and a narrowly tailored means of achieving that interest.118
Federal laws, however, which classify on the basis of alienage are
112. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
113. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1525 (governing immigration and nationality).
114. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-25.
115. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (stating that line-drawing between
groups of aliens to determine eligibility for social service programs is best left to the
political branches of the Federal government, and not the judiciary).
116. See, e.g., id.
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the
United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one whose
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is enti-
tled to that constitutional protection.
Id. at 77 (citations omitted).
117. JoHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.12, at 631 (3d ed. 1986).
118. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). A state statute im-
posed greater restrictions on legal resident aliens than on citizens for welfare bene-
fits. Id. at 367. The court found this distinction violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 382. Compare Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86-87 (holding congres-
sional classification based on residency of aliens constitutional). If the classification
is related to a 'political function," however, in which citizenship is a necessary pre-
requisite, then the classification is subject only to rational basis review. See
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). The Court has not extended strict




subject to traditional rational basis scrutiny and are upheld so long
as the classification rationally furthers a legitimate interest."19
Under Federal law, whether an alien is eligible for benefits
depends on the immigration status of the alien and the eligibility
requirements of the particular benefit program.12 0 Aliens who are
resident aliens, refugees, asylums, or of "parole" status are gener-
ally eligible for benefits, provided that they qualify for the individ-
ual programs.' 2 1 Aliens who enter the United States without valid
documents and are, thus, undocumented or "illegal" aliens, are al-
most never eligible for Federal government benefits.122
Because the U.S. Constitution gives the Federal government
considerably more discretion to make alienage distinctions than it
gives to State governments, intergovernmental relations have been
strained. The result is an ongoing struggle between Federal and
State governments. The Federal government's eligibility require-
ments for federal benefits and its failure to enforce immigration
statutes result in disproportionate burdens. 123 The states are frus-
trated because, although they cannot change federal immigration
policy, they must nevertheless "bear the entire social and economic
burden" when the Federal government does not contribute to the
costs.124 Still, the State of Florida must heed the Constitution,
even when the Federal government does not help pay the costs in-
curred by states.125
119. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 82-84. Congress determined that those
legal resident aliens who had resided within the United States for five years were
eligible for federal benefit. Id. at 70 n.2. The Court found that this classification did
not violate the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 87. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that a state violated Equal Protection by restricting
benefits based on alienage classifications).
120. DAVID CARLINER ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS AND REFUGEES: THE BASIC
ACLU GUIDE TO ALIEN AND REFUGEE RIGHTS 214 (An American Civil Liberties Union
Handbook, 2d ed. 1990).
121. Id.
122. CARLINER ET AL., supra note 120.
123. Janet M. Calvo, Alien Status Restrictions on Eligibility for Federally Funded
Assistance Programs, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 395, 424 (1987-88). Califor-
nia, New York, Texas, Illinois, and Florida bear the largest burden because most
aliens reside in these states. Id.
124. Id. See supra notes 58, 66 and accompanying text (discussing Florida's at-
tempts to obtain federal reimbursement for services provided to illegal immigrants).
See also supra note 49 (discussing California's response to immigration burdens).
125. Florida's suit against the Federal government for reimbursement is not the
first occasion that the Federal government has been the defendant in an immigra-
tion action. See Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). In Lewis, a New
York City health corporation intervened in a suit against the Federal government
because New York City was not being reimbursed for health care costs to aliens. Id.
at 1166.
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B. Plyler v. Doe: Special Protection for Alien Children
1. The Fourteenth Amendment Applies to Illegal Aliens
In Plyler v. Doe,126 the Court extended the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection guarantee to aliens who were unlaw-
fully in the United States, or "illegal aliens."127 In Plyler, the plain-
tiffs were illegal alien children who were challenging a Texas
statute which denied free public education to children who were not
citizens of the United States or not legally admitted to the United
States.128 Texas argued that the Fourteenth Amendment's phrase
"persons within the jurisdiction" did not extend to undocumented
aliens and that the children were not entitled to equal protection
under Texas law.' 29 The Court swiftly disposed of this argument,
stating that aliens, even though undocumented, are clearly "per-
sons," and have been previously guaranteed due process rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 30
To permit Texas to identify the undocumented children as
non-"persons" would enable Texas to avoid its obligation to provide
equal protection under Texas law to all persons.131 The Court
126. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
127. Id. at 215.
128. Id. at 206. Section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code made a classification
on the face of the statute and provided the following:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admit-
ted aliens and who are over the age of five years and under the age
of 21 years on the first day of September of any scholastic year shall
be entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund for that
year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a
legally admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not
over the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in
which admission is sought shall be permitted to attend the public
free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his par-
ent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at
the time he applies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state
shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition
all persons who are either citizens of the United States or legally
admitted aliens and who are over five and not over 21 years of age
at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent,
guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school
district.
Id. at 205 (citing Tx. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1981)).
129. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210.
130. Id. at 210 (1982). The Court stated that the Fifth Amendment protects un-
documented aliens from invidious discrimination by the Federal Government. Id.
(citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)).
131. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210.
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stated that to grant Texas such permission would violate the
clause's very intent, which is to abolish class-based legislation. 132
Like Texas, Florida has attempted to deny jurisdiction to un-
documented children because of their status. While the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that undocumented children enjoy the same
equal protection benefits as children who are citizens, this is a con-
clusion that "only begins the inquiry."' 33
2. An Intermediate Equal Protection Standard Is
Required
Applying equal protection analysis to most State acts requires
assurance that the State's classification is rationally related to a
legitimate State purpose.' 34 However, as Plyler reiterated, such
deference to State action is not available to classifications that af-
fect a "suspect class," or that infringe upon the exercise of a "funda-
mental right."135 When a suspect class or fundamental right is
affected, the Constitution requires that the State action meet the
strict scrutiny standard, which demands a narrowly tailored means
justifying a compelling state interest.136
The Plyler Court determined that illegal aliens are not a sus-
pect class, although aliens who lawfully reside in the United States
do attain "suspect class" distinction.13 7 Similarly, education is not
a fundamental right.138 Thus, the Texas statute did not have to
satisfy the strict scrutiny test of equal protection.' 3 9 Yet, the Court
required Texas to satisfy an intermediate scrutiny standard, which
132. Id. at 213. Although an alien's unlawful presence in the United States sub-
jects him or her to deportation, until he or she leaves the jurisdiction either volunta-
rily or involuntarily, he or she is entitled to equal protection of the laws of the States.
Id. at 215.
133. Id. at 215.
134. Id. at 216. This rational basis Equal Protection standard is applied to State
action regarding social and economic welfare legislation. This standard is usually
readily satisfied by the states since it is the minimum standard applied in equal
protection analysis. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (stat-
ing that the Constitution permits the states wide latitude with social or economic
legislation).
135. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). See McLaughlin v. Fla., 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964) (requiring Florida to meet strict scrutiny for a discriminatory stat-
ute); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (requiring
the State to meet intermediate scrutiny when discriminating on the basis of gender);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (requiring the State to meet intermedi-
ate scrutiny when discriminating against illegitimate children).
136. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(stating that laws subject to strict scrutiny "will be sustained only if they are suita-
bly tailored to serve a compelling state interest").
137. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 n.19.




requires more than mere rationality, because of the innocent chil-
dren affected and the nature of the interest involved.140
A "shadow population" comprised of illegal aliens has emerged
in the United States due, in part, to the lenient enforcement of im-
migration laws and the failure to effectively bar employment oppor-
tunities to illegal aliens.141 The Plyler Court was concerned that
these factors fostered a permanent caste of underclass undocu-
mented aliens.142 Children are special members of this underclass
because of their vulnerability and their inability to control their
parents, who alone are able to make their presence in the United
States lawful.' 43 The Court noted that a rational purpose for pe-
nalizing children who are unlawfully present in this country is al-
most inconceivable.144
The Court also considered the importance of education in
"maintaining the fabric" of society chiefly due to its lasting impact
on children's lives.i45 The special status of undocumented alien
children and the importance of education combine to elevate the
requisite standard to that of intermediate scrutiny, which requires
a showing of substantial state interest. 4 6 The Court questioned,
however, whether the Texas statute could even meet a minimum
rationality standard.14 7
A strong dissent by Justice Burger criticized the Court for tai-
loring the Equal Protection standard to Plyler's specific context,
rather than applying the minimum rationality standard tradition-
ally used by the Court.'48 Heeding Justice Burger's criticism, the
140. Id. at 224.
141. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218.
142. Id. at 219.
143. See id. at 220.
144. Id. at 220.
145. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (citing Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (re-
garding education as of supreme importance); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (stating that public schools are vital institutions in society);
Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (recognizing that some degree of education is
necessary to properly prepare children for civic duties)).
146. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
147. Id. at 220.
148. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, J., dissenting). Justice Burger was joined by
Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Id. at 242. The dissent deemed the ma-
jority approach "results-oriented," id. at 244, an approach aimed at compensating for
congressional failures and lack of effective immigration management. Id. at 242-43.
While these failures created grave socio-economic problems for the illegal aliens, the
Judiciary was not seen as the appropriate forum to resolve the immigration influx
and the correlating socio-economic dilemma; rather, the constitutional duty belonged
to Congress. Id. Justice Burger stated that Congress must decide whether to deport
or provide for illegal alien children; that it was inappropriate for the Court to com-
pensate for the failures of Congress. Id. at 254.
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Court may have limited the Plyler precedent in a more recent
decision.149
In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, the Court seemed to
limit Plyler by stating that Plyler's holding was not intended to go
beyond the "'unique circumstances' . . . that provoked its 'unique
confluence of theories and rationales.' "150 The Court refused to ex-
tend Plyler's elevated scrutiny in Kadrmas, a case which involved a
poor child unable to afford the busing fee charged for transportation
to a public school.151 The Court distinguished wealth and alienage
classifications, stating that while it did not require elevated scru-
tiny for wealth classifications, it did consider classifications based
on alienage to be suspect. 15 2 The Court also found significant that
the child in Kadrmas was not being punished for the illegal conduct
of her parents. 153 Finding that Kadrmas did not resemble Plyler,
the Court refused to extend Plyler's rationale.15 The Court, how-
ever, did not reverse Plyler,155 which still requires that Florida
laws meet a heightened equal protection scrutiny.
The "unique circumstances" of Plyler are equally applicable to
Jean and Carlos' situations. Like the children in Plyler, Carlos and
Jean are innocent, undocumented children who are being denied a
service that they would receive but for their immigrant status.
Rather than education, however, Carlos and Jean are being denied
foster care. The nature of the interest involved and the special
class of children affected require an intermediate Equal Protection
standard.
Like the children in Plyler, Jean and Carlos have been given
an inchoate justification to stay in the United States. Although the
INS is aware of their presence in the United States, the INS has
chosen not to take Jean into custody and would prefer not to deport
Carlos. The Supreme Court has recognized the special needs of un-
documented alien children and has given them a special protection,
149. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
150. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 243 (Powell, J., concur-
ring)). In Kadrmas, a mother and child from North Dakota challenged a Dickinson
School District's busing fee. Id. at 455. The family refused to sign the busing con-
tract and claimed that the fee violated equal protection based on Plyler. Id.
151. Id. at 459.
152. See id. at 457-58.
153. Id. at 459.
154. Id. at 460.
155. The Kadrmas decision stands for the Court's retreat from the context-specific
balancing approach it used in Plyler. The Supreme Court, 1987 Term - Leading
Cases, 102 HARv. L. REV. 143, 203 (1988). But the decision does not seem to have
altered the special consideration given to undocumented alien children, since the




particularly when they have been given an inchoate justification to
stay in the United States.156
Before elevating the standard in Plyler, the Court calculated
the nature of the interest being denied by Texas.'1 7 The justifica-
tions that the Court gave for elevating the standard for education
are equally applicable to foster care. Foster care, like education, is
not a fundamental right,s58 but it plays a pivotal role in our society
by providing children, who otherwise lack one, with a home. A sta-
ble home environment provides children with the same self-reliance
and self-sufficiency which the Court found to be provided by educa-
tion.15 9 The Court stated that education was a means to "awake" a
child to values, both social and professional.16 0 The Court found
education to be a necessity if society expects children "to succeed in
life."16 1 Likewise, foster care which provides a "home" for children
is of equally great importance for a child's social and intellectual
well-being.
The family relationship has been recognized as a fundamental
unit of society which contributes to a child's nurturing.162 Jean and
156. Plyler recognized the inability of children to have control over their illegal
presence in the United States. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220. Jean's mother placed him on
a boat which was en route to the United States and Carlos was without alternatives
when he was abandoned. Although Jean and Carlos' parents did not bring them to
the United States, the lack of control applies to undocumented children accompanied
by their parents as well. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing Brief
for Appellant at 24, R.G. v. Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, No.
94-0079) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. filed June 8, 1994) citing Elsperger, Florida's Battle
with the Federal Government Over Immigration Policy Holds Children Hostage:
"They Are Not Our Children!" (unpublished manuscript, 1994) for the children's in-
choate justification to reside in the United States)).
157. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
158. Foster care is not recognized as a fundamental right, although children may
acquire constitutional protections once they are taken into custody by the State. See,
e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9
(1988) (implying that the child would have a due process right if the state had re-
moved the child from his home and if he were abused in the foster home); see also
Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protections of Fos-
ter Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 217-44 (advo-
cating a child's constitutional right to safety in foster care).
159. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 (quoting Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221).
160. Id. at 223 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493).
161. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted that penalizing children
by withholding welfare benefits because of their parents' status, when the benefits
were made available to other children who qualify, would likewise be impermissible.
457 U.S. at 239 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
162. A host of decisions recognize the importance of the family unit. See Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (family instills most values); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (recognizing the fundamental interest in family
relationships); Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972) (stating the importance of
the family and family environment); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (the custody, care and nurturing of a child are a part of family life).
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Carlos are unaccompanied, undocumented children who are with-
out family. If denied benefit of Florida's dependency proceedings,
they lose the nurturing environment the foster care system pro-
vides.163 The foster care system has increasingly become a perma-
nent, rather than temporary, substitute for the family unit.164 In
the child care context the state has a responsibility to provide care
for a child when the parents are unable to maintain their own re-
sponsibilities.165 The Court has repeatedly recognized the state's
role as parens patriae in protecting children from harm. 166 Florida
is ignoring its parens patriae duty167 by denying foster care to un-
documented alien children. Because of the special status of alien
children and the nature of the foster care interest, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires Florida to satisfy a heightened standard of
scrutiny when the denial of foster care is challenged.
3. Federal Policy Supports Equal Treatment
In Plyler, Texas argued that because the children were unlaw-
fully present in the United States pursuant to Federal statute, the
State, too, could deprive illegal aliens Equal Protection of the
163. But see Stacie Marie Colvin, Comment, Lashawn A v. Dixon: Responding to
the Pleas of Children, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 529, 529 (1992) (the foster care sys-
tem in the United States is failing and in shambles).
164. See Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1249 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 'Neglected" Children: Standards
for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in
Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 625, 626-27
(1976)).
165. Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1348 (2d Cir. 1988) (the state is obligated
to act for parents and to fulfill parental obligations by providing religious needs to
children while the children are in foster care).
166. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1455 (1993) (O'Connor, J. concur-
ring). In Flores, the Court upheld an INS regulation which permitted detained juve-
nile aliens to be released only to their parents, close relatives, or legal guardians,
except in unusual circumstances, as not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
part because the regulation was designed to protect the welfare of juveniles.
167. The Supreme Court has qualified a State's duty to act by holding that the
Constitution does not impose an affirmative obligation upon a state to protect an
individual's liberty interest or to provide substantive services. See Deshaney v. Win-
nebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (a State may impose
"affirmative duties of care and protection," but such duties were not required by the
Constitution); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (as a general matter the
Constitution does not impose an affirmative obligation on a State to enable a woman
to exercise her constitutional right to an abortion). Jean and Carlos are not claiming
that the State has an affirmative duty to provide foster care. They are asserting that
because Florida provides foster care to other children who are similarly situated, but
for immigration status, they too qualify for Equal Protection under the law. The role
of foster care in a child's life and the State's provision of such care are factors illus-
trating the nature of the interest for determining the appropriate Equal Protection
standard, rather than determining whether the State has an affirmative duty to pro-
vide foster care.
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law.168 The Court, however, reiterated that classification of immi-
gration status was not within the constitutional domain of the
states; rather, Congress defined alien status.169 Congressional pol-
icy is considered when scrutinizing state action, but with respect to
illegal aliens, the action must "mirror federal objectives," as well as
further a state interest. 170 No Federal policy supported denying il-
legal alien children an elementary education.171 The failure of the
immigration statutory scheme to provide for the education of un-
documented alien children did not relieve Texas of the Equal Pro-
tection requirement.172 As in Plyler, neither Florida nor Congress
has initiated a law or policy in support of denying foster care serv-
ices to children. Rather, both Florida and federal laws do provide
for foster care, notwithstanding a child's undocumented alien
status. 17 3
4. Florida Must Show A Substantial State Interest
Plyler required Texas to show a substantial state interest for
its alienage classification.174 Preservation of limited resources for
lawful residents was an insufficient purpose to satisfy the height-
ened scrutiny. 175 The Court recognized three "colorable" interests
which might support the Texas statute.176 First, Texas claimed
that it wanted to protect itself from "an influx of illegal immi-
grants;" however, the Court found that illegal aliens under-utilize
public benefits and hardly come to the United States "in order to
avail themselves of a free education."177 Secondly, Texas claimed
that undocumented children specially burden the ability to provide
quality education; however, the Court found the differences be-
168. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
169. Id. at 225.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 226. Notwithstanding that an undocumented alien child may be de-
ported at any time upon the act of the Federal government, the Federal government
may choose never to act upon this right. Id. at 226. Plyler described this failure of
the Federal government to act as an "inchoate federal permission to remain." Id.
Thus, as long as the Federal government has not chosen to exercise deportation pro-
ceedings against a child, the State must assume that the child might never be
deported.
172. The Court did recognize that in another context undocumented status in con-
junction with an articulated Federal policy might strengthen a State's ability to ex-
clude undocumented aliens in its laws. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
173. See supra notes 51, 63-107 and accompanying text (discussing Florida and
the Federal government's provisions for child welfare services to children, regardless
of their immigration status).
174. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
175. Id.




tween undocumented children and lawfully resident alien children
nonexistent. 178 Finally, Texas claimed that the undocumented
children were less likely to stay in the state and would not put their
obtained education to societal use. Again, the Court found that
there was no guarantee that any child would stay within the
state. 179
Because Texas was unable to provide a substantial state inter-
est to deny education to a small class of innocent children, the stat-
ute at issue violated Equal Protection requirements and, thus, was
invalid.18o Unlike Texas, Florida's statutes and policies do not dis-
criminate against undocumented children in their language; never-
theless, Florida has discriminated against the children in its
application of the law and must satisfy Equal Protection
requirements. L8 1
Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
Director, Jim Towey, has stated that the denial of foster care is pro-
tecting the welfare of children by discouraging children from mak-
ing a dangerous journey to the United States.182 While protecting
the welfare of children is a State interest, as in Plyler, children do
not journey to the United States in search of foster care. Rather,
the prevailing reasons individuals seek refuge in the United States
are to escape a dreadful environment or to obtain employment.183
Thus, Florida's means, denying foster care, is not rationally related
to its state interest, protecting the welfare of children.
Second, Florida claims that the additional demands which un-
documented children place on the foster care system encroach upon
178. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229.
179. Id. at 229-30.
180. Id. at 230.
181. The language of the Florida statutes is nondiscriminatory. See supra notes
63-70 and accompanying text (describing the requirements of Florida law and pol-
icy). Yet, the Department of Rehabilitative Services has failed to provide care to
undocumented children, notwithstanding Florida law. See supra note 57 and accom-
panying text (describing the Department's refusal to provide services based on sta-
tus). When a statute or policy is facially neutral as to class distinction, the Court has
interpreted the Constitution to require a showing of purposeful discrimination. See,
e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (stating that the individual must
show that the State's application of the death penalty was purposefully discrimina-
tory). Assuming that the "directive" issued on April 14, 1994, is not a policy, Florida
officials have stated that Florida will not provide foster care to undocumented alien
children solely because of their status, this declaration satisfies the purposeful dis-
crimination requirement. See supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (discussing
Florida officials' statements to the U.S. Immigration Reform Commission).
182. New Front in Fight, supra note 40, at A14.
183. Martin, supra note 40, at 2 (stating that "jobs are the major lure for undocu-
mented aliens" coming to the United States).
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the services it is able to provide.184 However, Florida is providing
care to only 113 undocumented children out of the 9,000 children to
whom it provides services. These are all of the children that have
sought care when HRS provided services on an indiscriminate ba-
sis. The small number of undocumented children who have been
provided services has not especially burdened HRS since it provides
the same care to undocumented children as it would to any other
child. Florida's denial of foster care to undocumented children does
not further a substantial State interest, thus this practice violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
5. Florida Cannot Satisfy Even Minimum Scrutiny
Even if the Florida court does not use a heightened scrutiny
consistent with Plyler, but rather applies the minimum rationality
standard generally applied to socio-economic legislation, Florida
may still be unable to meet even this minimum standard. Notably,
the Plyler dissent found that the Texas statute satisfied minimum
scrutiny because Texas was conserving limited resources by choos-
ing not to provide benefits for persons whose very presence in the
United States was illegal.185 The dissent found Texas' choice sup-
ported by the Federal government's exclusion of illegal aliens from
many social welfare programs.386 Nonetheless, Justice Brennan
stated that it would be difficult to conceive of a reason to punish
especially vulnerable children in the United States for their pres-
ence, which in some instances has inchoate Federal approval.187
Saving money is not sufficient justification to satisfy the ra-
tionality test. Although the Supreme Court gives great deference to
a state's social and economic regulation, the circumstances war-
ranting such deference have not involved absolute deprivation.188
When a state absolutely deprives a group, whether suspect or not,
the Court focuses "more sharply on the state's rationale."18 9
Florida's classification is not rational because it does not draw
its distinctions based on characteristics peculiar to illegal alien sta-
tus.1 90 The Florida policy is inconsistent with the federal frame-
work because Florida has denied care to children solely because of
184. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text (describing Florida's struggle
with its budget).
185. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 248-50 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 251.
187. See id. at 220, 226.
188. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 586 n.25 (E.D. Tex. 1978), (citing Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), aff'd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).





their immigration status. Florida has not offered any reason for de-
nying services to undocumented children other than increased de-
mand and cost for services. Florida's classification cannot satisfy
even minimum rationality because no rational basis exists to deny
innocent children services, other than a strain on limited resources,
which by itself is insufficient to satisfy even a minimum level of
scrutiny.
IV. Federal Law Preempts State Action
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that
the Constitution and federal laws are the supreme law of the land,
notwithstanding state laws to the contrary. 19 1 Although the Fed-
eral government has well-established, exclusive power in the field
of immigration, not all state action relating to aliens is preempted
as a regulation of immigration.192 A state law may be preempted
under the Supremacy Clause when Congress has intended to over-
ride State power193 or when the State action burdens or conflicts
with Federal legislation.194
Congress has not sought to preclude State action in determin-
ing the welfare of undocumented children. Rather, federal legisla-
tion relies on the state to determine the best placement of the child,
considering his or her best interests. 195 By not complying with the
Federal government's framework, Florida has impeded the Federal
government in fulfilling its constitutional obligation to define immi-
gration status. Without state assistance, "special immigration sta-
tus" will be nonexistent for undocumented children because the
statutory framework requires a State court dependency determina-
tion before a child can be declared a special immigrant.19 6 Even if
Florida chooses not to comply with federal requirements in order to
receive funding for its foster care program,' 97 the Supremacy
Clause mandates that the states make dependency and foster care
determinations pursuant to their state law requirements, regard-
less of whether the foster care program is federally or state funded.
191. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
192. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
193. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357.
194. Id. at 357-58 n.5.
195. See supra notes 71-104 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity for
cooperation between the Federal and State governments).
196. See supra notes 97-101 (discussing the requirements for "special immigrant
status").




Arguably, Florida has violated State and Federal law by refus-
ing to provide welfare services to undocumented immigrant chil-
dren when it provides such services to non-immigrant children.
Florida state officials are combatting the Federal government's im-
migration policy, making children "hostages" unless the Federal
government reimburses Florida for services it has provided to
aliens. As illustrated, the vulnerability of children has allowed
Florida to attract national exposure to its fiscal dilemma, but State
and Federal law does not tolerate this exploitation. The State's
parens patriae role becomes especially necessary when a child is
without parents. Because of the special status of children and the
state's interest in furthering the welfare of children, State, Federal,
and constitutional law ensure that children are protected.
Florida's struggle is with the Federal government, which must
reexamine and prioritize its immigration policy. If the Federal gov-
ernment does not exercise its powers to deport immigrants, it must
take responsibility for the undocumented immigrants' inchoately
approved presence in the United States and reimburse the bur-
dened states for service costs. Cooperative federalism requires ne-
gotiations between State and Federal governments. Florida cannot
make innocent children soldiers in the front-lines in its battle
against the Federal government because children are the ones most
in need of protection.
Author's Note: Rejection of Children as "Hostages"
While this paper was in the publication process, a settlement
was reached in which an "Alien Children" Emergency Rule was
promulgated. The Rule clarifies Florida's commitment to the pro-
tection of children and rejects the use of children as "hostages." The
summary of the rule provides that it "affirms that the clear and
unambiguous policy of HRS is that all children in Florida who have
been abused, neglected or abandoned are to be treated the same."
Emergency Rules, 21 FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE WEEKLY, Mar. 10,
1995, at 1438. See Emergency Rules, 21 FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE
WEEKLY, Mar. 10, 1995, at 1438-40 (providing the full text of the
rule).
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